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Introduction 
Two issues have dominated the local government agenda since the election of a new 
Conservative government in May 2015: austerity and devolution.  After five years of 
spending cuts, which reduced English local authority budgets by more than one-third (NAO, 
2014a), the UK government has announced a further 56% reduction in central grant funding 
to local authorities over the next parliament (HM Treasury, 2015a, 2015b p.78).  Whilst 
denuding local government in resource terms, the Conservatives have made devolution a 
cornerstone of their policy agenda, promising a radical decentralisation of power to local 
level.  The ‘localism’ of the previous Coalition administration has developed into a strategy 
for stimulating economic growth based on greater sub-regional autonomy and increased 
competitiveness across and between the regions.  Local authorities have been invited to 
come forward with joint proposals to form combined authorities, which can ‘bid’ to take over 
powers currently held by Whitehall.  The government claims that the apparent 
austerity/devolution paradox can be resolved through moves to a ‘smarter state’ in which 
‘reform’ and ‘efficiency’ combine with devolved powers to deliver a local state in which ‘we 
can spend less but deliver more’ (Cameron, 2015a).   
Critics argue that the new agenda amounts to a strategy to decentralise super-austerity, 
shifting responsibility to the local level for ever deeper cuts and inevitable service reductions, 
in the context of increasing demand linked to demographic pressures (Kennett, Jones, 
Meegan, & Croft, 2015).  They also see the emerging patchwork of ‘devolution deals’ as 
challenging the redistributive assumptions of the established local government grant regime.  
At the same time, the government plans to make devolution contingent upon the introduction 
of directly elected ‘metro mayors’, with the aim of ensuring visible and personal 
accountability for combined authorities.  But there is considerable doubt about the 
democratic merits of forcing mayors upon localities, given the lack of support for mayors in 
recent city referenda.  There is also uncertainty about the role of locally elected councillors 
and prospects for citizen and community engagement, given that devolution involves an up-
scaling to the sub-regional level (Hammond, 2015; Wood, Lyall, & Bailey, 2015).   
This article examines prospects for local government under the first Conservative 
government for 18 years.  Reflecting upon the combination of ‘super-austerity’, devolution, 
and the ‘smarter state’, we argue that the emerging political agenda shows a new 
assertiveness in relation to restructuring the local state, which stands in contrast to the 
laissez faire approach of the previous Coalition government.  Although the Coalition piloted 
devolution in its final year (with the Greater Manchester Agreement), its signature policies of 
‘localism’ and the ‘Big Society’ focused on non-state actors, providing rights and 
opportunities for communities to challenge local government and establish their own 
services.  The common context, however, is spending cuts.  We suggest that local 
government now confronts a situation of super-austerity, in which new cuts come on top of 
previous ones, compounding their original impact and creating dangerous (and unevenly 
spread) multiplier effects.  We also ask whether the remarkable resilience shown by local 
government to date (Gardner & Lowndes, 2015; Lowndes & McCaughie, 2013) can be 
further sustained, especially in those service areas that lie beyond the devolution limelight.  
The paper starts with a consideration of the Conservative government’s spending plans and 
goes on to analyse the devolution and smarter state agendas.   
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Super-austerity 
The Coalition government of 2010-2015 undertook a radical programme of public spending 
cuts, representing the most significant reorganisation of public spending since the second 
world war (Taylor-Gooby, 2012). Cuts were rooted in a political commitment to reduce 
aggressively the UK’s budget deficit, which had burgeoned following the recapitalisation of 
major banks during the financial crisis in 2008.  In June 2015 George Osborne, the 
Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer, indicated that spending reductions would 
continue on the same trajectory, with a cut in public sector net borrowing of 1.1% of GDP per 
year, on average, to achieve an overall surplus in 2019-20.  This aspiration is  underpinned 
by a ‘new fiscal charter’ for the UK to become a ‘country that lives within its means’ (HM 
Treasury, 2015a).  To achieve this (without significant tax rises), £18bn of ‘consolidation’ 
measures will be required, including £12bn cuts to departmental spending, £3.6bn from 
preventing tax-avoidance plus a further £3bn from a new ‘apprenticeship levy’ on major 
employers (HM Treasury, 2015b p.15).  This ‘new fiscal charter’ marks an overt departure 
from post-war models for funding the welfare state, which have traditionally relied upon 
government borrowing financed by economic growth.   
Under the Coalition, expenditure on the NHS, defence, education and international 
development were relatively protected, whilst the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) took the largest cut of 51% (HM Treasury, 2010 p.10).  This pattern is 
set to persist under the Conservative government, including a projected rise of £10bn a year 
(in real terms) in health spending to 2020.  By contrast, ‘unprotected’ departments, including 
the DCLG, have  once again been told to expect spending cuts of between 25 and 40% (HM 
Treasury, 2015 p.7).  Although some servic s – such as the police – have escaped the cuts 
threatened in the summer of 2015, the heaviest reductions again fell on local government.  
Given that local government  experienced the most extensive spending reductions under the 
Coalition, the new cuts are leading to strong cumulative effects.  Local government is in the 
grip of super-austerity. 
There has been some international criticism of the UK’s plans.  Among economists, Joseph 
Stieglitz, Paul Krugman and Thomas Piketty have all been vocal opponents of austerity as a 
response to the international sovereign debt crisis. The OECD warned that Osborne’s 
planned deficit reduction measures have the potential to impact negatively on the UK’s 
growth (Giles, 2015); and the IMF suggested that advanced economies could be better 
served by living with high levels of debt, rather than aggressive debt-reduction programmes 
(Ostry, Ghosh, & Espinoza, 2015).  However, there have also been international attempts to 
replicate the UK’s approach, including by Tony Abbott (Australia) and Stephen Harper 
(Canada), although both now find themselves out of office.  Domestically, both the Coalition 
and Conservative governments have to date been successful at minimising opposition to 
cuts in local government spending.  This has been achieved partly through constructing a 
discourse on the necessity of deficit reduction, accompanied by appeals to culturally 
resonant memories of post-war ‘austerity’, associated with shared responsibility and 
interdependence (Appelbaum, 2014; Clarke & Newman, 2012).  But it is also the result of a 
careful process of selective targeting, focussing on services without powerful institutional 
champions or voting blocs (Peck, 2012 p.631).  Cuts are also obfuscated by variations in the 
way they are applied.  For instance, the Conservatives’ ‘triple lock’ guaranteeing pension 
growth (by earnings growth, price inflation or 2.5%, whichever is the highest,) means that the 
proportion of welfare spending on pensions is set to increase, with welfare benefit and tax-
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credit cuts mainly impacting on working-age people (Lupton et al., 2015).  This extends a 
pattern established under the Coalition whereby benefits and services for older people have 
been relatively protected, shifting many cuts onto the younger and working age population 
(Hastings, Bramley, Bailey, & Watkins, 2012 p.50).   
Meanwhile the local government grant distribution system, whereby local authorities face a 
‘flat rate’ percentage cut to grant funding, results in spending cuts continuing to impact more 
heavily, in absolute terms, on those authorities who receive a higher proportion of their 
funding through central grants.  These are typically local authorities with higher levels of 
multiple deprivation (Innes & Tetlow, 2015 p.322), which also experienced the largest 
spending cuts under the Coalition (Audit Commission, 2013 p.23; Hastings et al., 2013 p.50; 
NAO, 2014 p.14), albeit from a higher funding base.  Such areas have generally lost greater 
sums from their local economies as a result of the Coalition’s welfare reforms (Beatty & 
Fothergill, 2013; Wilson, Morgan, Rahman, & Vaid, 2013).  The same local authorities have 
been those least likely to benefit from Coalition policies offering additional sources of 
income, such as the opportunity to retain business rates uplift, the ‘new homes bonus’ and 
council tax freeze grant (all these policies favoured local authorities with stronger local 
economies and higher value housing.) In short, there is a distinctive geography of austerity, 
in which different localities are affected to a greater or lesser extent, depending on factors 
such as their level of cuts to date, ability to raise additional income and access to sources of 
resilience, such as local assets and reserves.  There is likely to be a deepening of spatial 
inequalities and increased polarisation between prosperous and struggling localities 
(Hamnett, 2014).   
The Conservatives’ austerity programme also starts from a very different position from that 
of the Coalition, where cuts initially acted to reverse Labour’s sustained investment in public 
services (Innes & Tetlow, 2015a p.16).  Where Coalition cuts were met by (relatively 
speaking) well-fed local authorities, Conservative cuts are l being met by emaciated 
councils.  Failure does not look likely to be restricted to the councils suffering the deepest 
financial losses.  Some local authorities in relatively affluent areas, which have historically 
existed on a low council tax base, with minimal reserves or inflexible high-value outsourcing 
agreements, also appear to be struggling (as in press reports on Northamptonshire, Isle of 
Wight and West Somerset) (Municipal Journal, 2015b, 2015c).  Certain services, such as 
social care, are already suffering recurrent crises, and some local authorities have indicated 
that they are entering financial difficulties. The (Conservative controlled) Local Government 
Association (LGA) has warned that: ‘Even if councils stopped filling in potholes, maintaining 
parks, closed all children's centres, libraries, museums, leisure centres and turned off every 
street light they will not have saved enough money to plug the financial black hole they face 
by 2020’ (Local Government Association, 2015).  Sceptics may suggest that funding gap 
predictions associated with LGA's original 'graph of doom' have failed to materialise (LGA, 
2012 p.8), but multiple studies suggest that the scope for efficiencies is now severely 
reduced – a point that we return to later in the article (see Audit Commission, 2013; 
Fitzgerald & Lupton, 2015; Hastings et al., 2013).  What is not clear is whether local 
government as a whole has reached a tipping point.  Will the next five years represent 
austerity-redux, in which councils again prove themselves to be the ‘great survivors’ (John, 
2014), or is the new round of cuts unsustainable?  
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David Cameron (2015a) addresses the challenge of austerity by posing these rhetorical 
questions: ‘How can you be a “one nation” government and at the same time cut spending?  
How can you help people get on when there’s not so much money around?’  Cameron 
argues the he can square the circle though restructuring the state according to principles of 
devolution, reform and efficiency.  What does this mean for local government?  We start by 
considering devolution.  
 
Devolution 
The energy and emotion of the 2014 Scottish referendum provided fresh momentum to a 
formerly moribund debate about the powers available to local authorities in England, after 
New Labour’s failure to garner sufficient public support for regional assemblies and local 
elected mayors.  In the wake of the referendum, devolution to English regions presented the 
Coalition with an opportunity to link its ‘localism’ agenda to an economic growth strategy 
based on city agglomerations, which aimed at reproducing the success of London and the 
south east, and rebalancing the national economy (Centre for Cities, 2014; Core Cities, 
2013; Cox, Henderson, & Raikes, 2014a; Heseltine, 2012).  It also detracted (at least some) 
attention from more contentious calls for an English parliament, in the context of the Smith 
Commission’s Report promising more powers for Scotland. Championed by the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, George Osborne (himself MP for a Cheshire constituency), the policy was 
undoubtedly also aimed at ‘doing something for the North’ in the run-up to the 2015 general 
election.   
Devolution has not, however, been simply a top-down political manoeuvre.  Beyond 
parliament, the Scottish referendum strengthened calls for a redistribution of power within 
regions, reflecting discontent with London bias in politics and business investment, and a 
desire to express city and regional identities.  The ‘Core Cities’ lobbying group, representing 
the eight largest cities in England, was instrumental in championing the benefits of local 
autonomy and economic self-sufficiency, and had initiated the first wave of ‘City Deals’ with 
the Coalition government in 2013, which (although limited in scope) provided a starting point 
for more detailed negotiations between Whitehall and localities.  Meanwhile in Parliament 
cross-party consensus on devolution was growing, with the Commons Political and 
Constitutional Reform Committee suggesting that ‘local government should be the model for 
devolution in England’ (Werran & Hailstone, 2014), including provision for  a secure financial 
base and a range of revenue raising powers (Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 
2013 p.3).  
Ambitious plans for sub-regional devolution were subsequently pioneered in Greater 
Manchester from November 2014 (Sandford, 2015b).  These plans built on a long tradition of 
co-operation between Manchester authorities culminating in the creation of the Greater 
Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) in 2011.  The GMCA was originally established to 
co-ordinate transport and economic development functions, using powers in the Local 
Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009.  Under a devolution deal 
with the Coalition government the GMCA subsequently negotiated a novel ‘earn back’ 
scheme for business rates revenue and, in 2015, strategic oversight of substantial health 
funding, conditional on the adoption of a directly elected mayor.    The total value of 
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transferred budgets has been estimated at £7bn (with £6bn accounted for by health and 
social care spending). 
Building on Manchester’s example, a further four combined authorities were agreed in 
principle by the Coalition, in Sheffield, West Yorkshire, Liverpool and the North East (LGA, 
2015a; Sandford, 2015a), thus creating a vanguard for Osborne’s ‘Northern Powerhouse’.  
At first, the process of creating combined authorities was relatively rigorous and slow-
moving, involving the following stages: a governance review; a requirement to publish a 
‘scheme’ for the authority attracting the consent of all participating authorities; and a 
consultation by the Secretary of State to ensure that the arrangements would be both 
efficient and in the interests of communities.  The first combined authorities were all centred 
on areas with strengths in regional working.  Some built on the legacies of Metropolitan 
County Councils, abolished in 1985, which had been established on the basis of ‘functional 
economic geography’ (Sandford, 2015a).  In addition they tended to demonstrate strong 
local and elite linkages (both within localities and vertically to Whitehall and Westminster), 
and strong and relatively homogenous local identities.   
However, after the Conservatives’ election victory in 2015, the impetus for ‘devolution deals’ 
has begun to overtake the creation of combined authorities.  A Cities and Devolution Bill was 
launched straight after the election (HM Government, 2015), accompanied by an 
announcement that Cornwall had been granted a ‘devolution deal’ before a combined 
authority had been formally agreed.  All local authorities (and not just city-regions) were 
subsequently invited to submit ‘fiscally neutral’ proposals for combined authorities and 
devolution in advance of the 2015 comprehensive spending review, with 38 proposals 
submitted by the 4th September 2015 deadline.  This was a very different process, driven 
forward under the threat of spending cuts, over a summer of frantic negotiations between 
authorities that in many cases were not natural partners.  New devolution agreements have 
followed, including with the Sheffield City Region Combined Authority, which agreed to adopt 
the mayoral model (worth £900m, focusing on transport, skills, planning and investment), 
and with two combined authorities which together cover the North East of England (worth a 
total of £1bn in devolved budgets).  To underscore his ‘devolution revolution’, George 
Osborne announced his intention to move towards  the full localisation of business rates by 
the 2020 (in exchange for scrapping revenue support grant) (Osborne, 2015; HM Treasury, 
2015b).   
What then are we to make of devolution to date? On the one hand there is no doubt that the 
concept has widespread support, in parliament, amongst cities, and in some two tier areas.  
For local government campaigners, devolution represents a long awaited breakthrough.  
Simon Jenkins (2014) who chaired the Commission on Local Democracy 20 years ago, 
argues that devolution at last has ‘traction’.  Unusually for public service reform, the 
government has eschewed a one-size-fits-all approach and developed a strategy that not 
just tolerates, but actually celebrates, local variation, and also allows for future iterations as 
contexts and priorities change.  Benefits for economic growth have been calculated by think-
tanks, notably economist Jim O’Neill’s City Growth Commission (2014).  The Institute of 
Public Policy Research has demonstrated through polling public preferences for more power 
to be exercised locally, and argued that the current devolution deals should be situated 
within a ‘decentralisation decade’,  in which a full range of powers are progressively passed 
from Westminster to local government (Cox, Raikes, & Henderson, 2014b).  
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However, devolution can also be seen as a diversionary tactic, aimed at drawing core local 
authority functions closer to central government, whilst distracting attention from the 
spending cuts that undermine remaining services. The abolition of national performance 
indicators and inspection regimes since 2010 has also meant that service delivery 
arrangements are increasingly varied at local level; in this context, devolution could be seen 
as making a virtue out of the ‘post code lottery’.  Crucially, although Conservative statements 
talk about devolution to communities and localities, combined authorities represent sub-
regional rather than local government.  Proposals for combined authorities have (to date) 
mapped on to Local Enterprise Partnership boundaries, which are business not community 
led and reflect ‘functional economic areas’ (DCLG, 2015) over other understandings of local 
identity and interests.  Even where devolution is occurring, for example in the initiative to 
localise business rates, the ability to raise the rate (by a centrally-defined limit of 2%) will be 
dependent on the appointment of a directly elected mayor.  Similarly the new ‘social care 
precept’ is limited to an additional 2% on council tax, a sum that the LGA claims is unlikely to 
resolve the funding gap (Municipal Journal, 2015a). 
The opportunity for real local choice in the design of devolution deals appears to be heavily 
circumscribed.  Indeed, the government has withheld deals for combined authorities that do 
not want a directly elected mayor.  Mayors remain controversial because the largest cities 
(including Manchester) specifically rejected mayors in recent referenda (2012).  The 
installation of mayors also challenges long-standing party dominance and, with it, a crucial 
power base for Labour (especially after Labour’s decimation in post-referendum Scotland).  
Even without a mayor, democratic representation within combined authorities is problematic: 
governance consists of cabinets made up the leaders of the constituent authorities, with 
limited overview and scrutiny arrangements.  Unlike the Greater London Authority, combined 
authorities will not have elected assemblies.  There is a very real danger that power is being 
drawn further into executive functions, with very limited opportunity for local backbench 
councillors to influence, or take part in, the affairs of the combined authorities.  Moreover, 
negotiations on devolution deals are being completed by elites, in conditions of secrecy, with 
little or no public consultation.  
It is argued by some that the evidence base is weak for devolution’s ability to actually 
stimulate economic growth – at least against the certainty of short-term spending cuts (Wood 
et al., 2015).  The localisation of business rates, while increasing local autonomy, is also 
likely to prove regressive, reinforcing benefits to localities with stronger economies and 
penalising localities with higher levels of deprivation.   Few localities share Greater 
Manchester’s economic coherence and cultural identity, or its historic strengths in 
collaborative working across constituent boroughs.  There is a danger that hurried 
agreements are being negotiated by ‘austerian realists’, to use Jonathan Davies’ term 
(2016), in an attempt to offset spending cuts.  There is no new money from the Exchequer, 
but devolution does provide combined authorities with opportunities to retain a share of 
business rates raised in their locality (scheduled to  rise to 100% by 2020) and control the 
level of rates (albeit within centrally agreed limits).  Instrumental deal-chasing on the part of 
both local and central government could lead to patchwork solutions, disadvantaging 
localities without natural local linkages, in a context where the principal of redistributing 
funding from prosperous to poorer areas is being steadily eroded.  Given the Coalition’s 
abolition of local government’s regulatory and monitoring framework, devolution might also 
be viewed as a neat policy manoeuvre which allows the Conservative government to 
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disavow responsibility for fragmented services it can no longer control, in the context of 
unpopular and unsustainable budget cuts.  
 
A ‘Smarter state’? 
So how are the Conservatives proposing to address what could be seen as a 
devolution/austerity paradox?  Cameron (2015a) proposes that building a ‘smarter state’ will 
mean that ‘more can be delivered for less’.  The smarter state will be characterised not only 
by devolution, but also by efficiency and reform.  Cameron calls for ‘streamlining’ state 
bodies, breaking state monopolies, opening up contracts to small businesses, bringing in 
new providers, digitalisation, shared services, early intervention, and public service 
innovation (the ‘Better Care Fund’, for instance, will support collaboration between health 
and social care services).   
There is a strange anachronism about Cameron’s proposals; it is as if he were addressing 
the public sector bureaucracies of the 1970s.  They are  essentially a restatement of the 
‘new public management’ mantra introduced by the Conservative governments of the 1980s, 
and normalised ever since.  Claiming to constitute a radical new agenda, Cameron’s 
proposals read more like a roll call of local government’s own priorities over the last five 
years.  These are not new ideas but a statement of processes already accelerated under the 
Coalition, as local government has sought to cope with public spending cuts whilst 
protecting, as far as possible, local services.  Despite the overall extent of spending cuts, 
research shows that local authorities have (to a limited extent) been able to offset funding 
reductions and protect a wide range of services, mainly through back office efficiencies 
(Audit Commission, 2013 p.32; Hastings et al., 2013 p.24) but also through the re-design of 
local services.  Local authorities have  begun an ad-hoc process of integration, with numbers 
of ‘shared services’ arrangements rising from 220 in 2012 to 416 in 2015 (LGA, 2015b).  
These are agreements between individual local authorities to share services, most 
commonly back-office functions like HR, finance, legal services and procurement, but also 
highways, environment and regulatory services.  Local authorities are also engaging in joint 
procurement of services from external providers.  Charging, commissioning, co-production 
and early intervention characterise local government service delivery strategies across 
England.  Digital technology is also being used to facilitate ‘channel shift’, join up customer 
contact (between services), reduce demand and pass administrative costs back to 
‘customers’.   
Cameron’s smart state repertoire may have already started to meet its limitations, however, 
just as the ‘new’ policy is launched.  Some local authorities are now ‘in-sourcing’ (bringing 
services back in-house) to reduce inflexibilities and cost pressures associated with 
contracting (NAO, 2014b p.23) and a number of commentators have warned of ‘limits to 
resilience’ (Fitzgerald & Lupton, 2015 p.582).  Many of the efficiency measures taken by 
local authorities to reduce their budgets under the Coalition have been one-off savings, 
which cannot now be repeated (Audit Commission, 2013 p.5).  Further cuts can only be 
made through what the National Audit Office calls ‘untested service transformation 
programmes’ (NAO, 2014b p.10), but declining professional capacity, and reducing financial 
reserves, puts at risk future innovation to plug budget gaps.  ‘Efficiencies’ have also 
obscured arms-length spending cuts achieved through the renegotiation of contracts with 
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external suppliers, particularly in the voluntary and community sector (Fitzgerald & Lupton, 
2015 p.590), where the knock-on effects of austerity are being keenly felt.  It is clear that the 
volume of services being delivered has fallen (NAO, 2014b p.33), despite the surface level 
stability of local government, and that eligibility for some core services, such as adult social 
care, has been steadily reduced.  Implications for service quality are uncertain (partly due to 
the reduction in audited performance data under the Coalition), but it has been observed that 
relatively small adjustments to services or charges can nonetheless have considerable 
impacts on vulnerable sections of the community (Fitzgerald and Lupton 2015).  The steady 
contraction of the state has also been linked to the ‘responsibilization’ of citizens in what is, 
in effect, a ‘great risk shift’, in which communities are increasingly called upon to provide 
their own safety nets (Kennett et al., 2015).  It is hard to know whether the ‘smarter state’ 
marque itself will gain policy traction, but the direction of travel seems clear. 
Interestingly, although local government could be seen as a vital prototype for the 
Conservatives’ smart state, it is strangely absent from Cameron’s (2015a) vision.  This 
focuses on national services, including the NHS, security and prisons.  Where ‘local’ is 
mentioned it isn’t linked to elected local authorities but to ‘local people’, ‘areas’ and 
‘communities’.  There is a mention of rising public satisfaction with local government under 
the Coalition (disputed elsewhere, see Hastings, Bailey, Bramley, Gannon, & Watkins, 2015 
p.24), but otherwise local authorities are mentioned only in relation to failing services, and 
with reference to further collaboration with charities.  There is a hint that Cameron’s intention 
is to use local government approaches for national services; for instance, he proposes 
learning from the opt-out of schools in providing prisons with greater operational autonomy.  
But this does not fully explain the invisibilising of local government. 
Cameron also places a familiar Conservative emphasis upon the individual rather than the 
collective experience (the word ‘people’ is mentioned 20 times, but ‘public’ only five times). 
Paradoxically, Cameron (2015b) goes on to argue, in his speech to the post-election party 
conference, that the country ‘doesn’t just need a stronger economy – it needs a stronger 
society’.  While promising to tackle the ‘no go’ areas of entrenched poverty, criminality and 
extremism, he omits to link these challenges to support for local services, indeed for the very 
services that have suffered the most under Coalition cuts, and now face a further wave of 
austerity.  The cessation of ‘supporting people’ funding, for instance, has impacted on 
services assisting those in danger of becoming homeless, whilst police and community 
safety budgets have been cut, and investment in community cohesion, youth services and 
community development has been among the worst hit areas of local government spending 
(Gardner and Lowndes 2015).  Local government is also being ‘written out’ of services that 
were previously its core business.  All schools are to be moved to ‘academy’ status 
(managed as separate entities, funded and inspected by central government), and similar 
‘freedoms’ are promised to high performing children’s services (child protection and social 
care). 
Coalition spending cuts were identified as potentially ‘ideological’ by Gerry Stoker and Peter 
Taylor Gooby (Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 2011), who noted that projections showed Britain 
heading towards a level of state intervention below that of the USA.  But the Coalition 
government showed a distaste for actively reorganising the state, preferring a laissez faire 
approach; to quote DCLG Secretary of State Eric Pickles, ‘you change reality and wait for 
the structure to catch up’.  The approach was to make the cuts and let the structures look 
after themselves. Pickles admitted to having threatened to ‘shoot’ the first official who 
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suggested local government reorganisation (Pickles, 2014).  Coalition policies of ‘localism’ 
and the ‘Big Society’ represented a ‘backing off’ from New Labour’s interventionist policies 
towards local government (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012).  The only significant restructuring 
under the Coalition was negative, with the abolition of regulatory bodies like the Audit 
Commission.  In marked contrast, the Conservatives are promising to ‘reimagine the state’ 
(George Osborne quoted by Jenkins, 2015) through devolution (focused on economic 
growth) and the ongoing marketization of core public services (like social care and housing).  
No less ideological, the Conservatives appear to be pursuing what Peck and Tickell (2002) 
call ‘roll-out’ strategies, in contrast with the ‘roll-back’ approach of the Coalition.  Rather than 
simply cutting back previous state forms, roll-out involves active state building in pursuit of 
right wing political ideology.  But state restructuring doesn’t have to imply ‘more’ state.  As 
we have seen, the Conservatives are ramping up the Coalition’s programme of public 
spending cuts.  The devolution/smarter state formula neatly reflects what Peck and Tickell 
call ‘the ‘neoliberal lock-in of public sector austerity and growth-chasing economic 
development’. 
 
Discussion 
In 2013 Lowndes and McCaughie observed the lack of a ‘big idea’ for local government 
under the Coalition (beyond austerity).  Localism and the ‘Big Society’ were focused on the 
space beyond local government, with the intention that this should expand to fill the gaps left 
by shrinking the local state.  In contrast, the Conservative government does have a big idea 
for local government - devolution.  But, as this article has shown, the real effects of 
devolution upon local government are as yet unclear. It is important to note that any plan for 
devolution needs to be seen in the context of multi-level governance.  Decentralising moves 
from central to sub-regional government can also be seen as centralising movements from 
local government (including districts, counties and city unitaries) to the sub-regional level. At 
the same time as combined authorities are gaining powers from Whitehall, responsibilities 
for entire areas of policy are being lost from local government as they are drawn upwards 
into new combined authorities.  It is true that the amalgamation of municipalities, or the 
establishment of service-delivery consortia, is common elsewhere in Europe, but this is in a 
context where primary authorities serve far smaller populations and geographical areas 
(Baldersheim & Rose, 2010). 
In general terms, decentralisation has both political and operational dimensions;  clarity is 
needed as to what sort of power is being devolved in the case of the new ‘devolution deals’.  
It looks very much like central government is holding onto political power, whilst 
decentralising operational responsibilities (and responsibility for contracting budgets).   
Central government is exercising control over the parameters of individual ‘deals’, which 
determine the specific menu of devolved powers for each locality.  The use of enabling 
legislation alongside locality specific negotiations provides flexibility to suit local needs but, 
at the same time, gives central government the opportunity to exercise political patronage by 
differentially rewarding assorted localities.  The promise of future powers, linked to 
performance against centrally agreed targets, may serve to rehabilitate the phenomenon of 
‘earned autonomy’ established under New Labour (Lowndes, 2002).  Such an approach may 
be effective in an operational sense (including delivering central government priorities), but 
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should not be confused with the devolution of political power or local autonomy (Pratchett, 
2004). 
Because combined authorities are indirectly elected, in the sense of bringing together 
representatives elected at another level, there may be limited gains for local democracy. The 
new combined authorities will not have their own elected assemblies in the manner of the 
Greater London Authority.  The scale of sub-regional authorities may also hinder practices of 
community engagement and citizen participation (such policies have certainly not had a high 
profile in devolution deals to date). A lot hangs on the democratic merits of the directly 
elected mayor provision embodied in the 2015 Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill 
(HM Government, 2015).  Will mayoral elections attract sufficient public interest to ensure 
turn-outs (and attendant legitimacy) significantly higher than the (average) 15% achieved for 
the directly elected Police and Crime Commissioners introduced in 2012 (Berman, Coleman, 
& Taylor, 2012)?  What are the prospects for ‘constituting a public’ (Newman, 2013) at the 
sub-central level, particularly for combined authorities outside the core city regions?  Central 
government power could also be enhanced in a situation in which Whitehall deals with a 
cadre of individual mayors rather than a large number of locally elected councils, many of 
which are in the hands of opposition parties. There is a danger that this relationship could 
become a supervisory one, rather than a relationship between equals, and that metro 
mayors may feel themselves answerable to central government rather than sub-regional 
electorates.   
It is also clear that the ‘devolution revolution’ is having different effects for different service 
areas.  Although the landmark Manchester agreement included control over NHS and social 
care budgets (with a view to developing new integrated services), the focus of the devolution 
deals has been overwhelmingly upon economic development (investment, planning, 
transport and other infrastructure, jobs and skills).  This is in keeping with George Osborne’s 
intention that devolution should stimulate economic growth beyond London and the South 
East.  However, the risk is that economic development develops a privileged status (in terms 
of access to funds and policy influence) to the disadvantage of other local services including 
social care, housing, culture and leisure.  There is a danger that local elites (from business 
and civic life as well as local government) are turning like moths towards the bright light of 
devolution, and away from the ‘too hard’ box of delivering day-to-day local services, as the 
compound and escalating effects of a further round of austerity start to hit. 
We have argued that David Cameron’s ‘smarter state’ amounts to little more than a recycling 
of new public management diktats, and that his call for ‘efficiencies’ is likely to be met by 
hollow laughs among those in local government who have applied cuts of one-third to 
budgets since 2010.  It is possible that we will see a segmentation of local government along 
the lines of Peter Saunders’ (1982) ‘dual state thesis’, whereby services related to economic 
production are up-scaled to the sub-regional level while services oriented to social 
consumption are concentrated in a residualised form of local government.  Such a 
distinction, Saunders argues, reflects the priorities of the capitalist state.  David Cameron 
has promised to tackle the ‘no go’ areas of entrenched poverty, criminality and extremism, 
yet refuses to link these challenges to new support for local services weakened by super-
austerity (Cameron, 2015).  Disadvantaged areas have also suffered the greatest impact 
from the cuts, an effect that could become more extreme as devolution starts to undermine 
the redistributive assumptions of the grant regime (with localities increasingly dependent on 
business rates raised in their own area). Devolution could come at the cost of a disconnect 
Page 10 of 15
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/flgs  Email: lgs@contacts.bham.ac.uk
Local Government Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
11 
 
between major strategic services and neighbourhood councillors and communities, 
alongside a much higher level of local risk, devolved to localities on a model increasingly 
similar to that found in US cities (where municipal bankruptcy is not uncommon). 
Our analysis of prospects for local government under the Conservatives reveals, however, 
narratives of optimism as well as pessimism.  Optimists celebrate the creativity and 
resilience shown by local authorities in mitigating the impact of cuts to date.  Evidence 
shows local authorities developing new technologies and service delivery mechanisms and 
building collaborative relationships with each other and with non-public sector providers.  
There is even a new assertiveness, which sees local authorities moving beyond the ‘new 
public management’ to develop ventures more redolent of nineteenth century civic traditions 
(Gardner & Lowndes, 2015).  Local authorities have enabled their in-house services to take 
in business from the private sector (vehicle maintenance in municipal bus garages, for 
instance), whilst also developing their investment role in local infrastructure (like new city 
tramlines), their potential as commissioners or providers of lower-cost utilities (notably 
energy and broadband), and even their scope for bypassing banks through support to peer-
to-peer lending schemes.  For optimists, devolution provides a golden opportunity for local 
authorities (in combination) to build on a new self-confidence (wrought out of hardship), as 
they champion local identities and acquire new powers in a challenge to England’s 
historically centralised and London-focused governing culture.  An ongoing devolution 
programme also holds out the possibility of better, and more economical, social care 
services for the elderly and vulnerable, if local government and NHS funding can be 
integrated at sub-regional level.   
We must be careful not to dismiss such optimism as naïve.  Peter John’s (2014) portrait of 
local government as the ‘great survivor’ depicts a history of resilience through opportunism, 
driven by a stable political and bureaucratic core.  This mechanism may be in action once 
again in the current acceptance of austerity, hand-in-glove with devolution.  Officers and 
local politicians may be pragmatically addressing the challenges of austerity (delivering both 
efficiencies and innovative local reforms), knowing that their legal and financial room for 
manoeuvre is minimal, but seeking to expand their capacity for agency by any available 
means. Referring to the negotiation of devolution deals, one local authority chief executive 
has remarked: ‘If we are going to sell our soul, we are going to have to make sure we do it 
for a decent price’ (Jameson, 2015).    
Yet the diversity of local government undermines its capacity to extract that high price lies.  
Some local authorities may benefit from devolution, while for others the risks will outweigh 
rewards.  There is mounting evidence that resilience to austerity could prove to be a thin 
veneer, intensely localised and place specific, dependent on local advantages, historic 
assets and resources.  At the same time, the sector could be further fragmented by a 
differentiated patchwork of governance and service delivery accountabilities.  Some political 
elites, notably in major cities, may be undermined through the installation of elected mayors.  
All these factors speak of local institutions being steadily eroded.  Moreover, the public has 
yet to be adequately engaged in what is in danger of becoming a technocratic transfer of 
power.   
  
Page 11 of 15
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/flgs  Email: lgs@contacts.bham.ac.uk
Local Government Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
12 
 
References 
Appelbaum, R. (2014). Sunken Treasure: The Cultural Meaning of Austerity in Austerity 
Britain. Symploke, 22(1-2), 77–95. 
Audit Commission. (2013). Tough Times 2013. London: Audit Commission. Retrieved from 
http://www.audit-commission.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Tough-Times-
2013e4.pdf 
Baldersheim, H., & Rose, L. (2010). Territorial Choice: The Politics of Boundaries and 
Borders. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Beatty, C., & Fothergill, S. (2013). Hitting the Poorest Places Hardest. Sheffield: Sheffield 
Hallam University. Retrieved from 
http://www.shu.ac.uk/research/cresr/sites/shu.ac.uk/files/hitting-poorest-places-
hardest_0.pdf 
Berman, G., Coleman, C., & Taylor, M. (2012). Police and Crime Commissioner Elections 
2012. London: House of Commons Library. Retrieved from 
http://www.apace.org.uk/var/files/1382710714_245 12 - House of Commons - 
RESEARCH PAPER 12 73.pdf 
Cameron, D. (2015). The Prim  Minister’s party conference speech in full. 
www.conservativehome.com. Retrieved from 
http://www.conservativehome.com/parliament/2015/10/david-camerons-party-
conference-speech-in-full-2.html 
Centre for Cities. (2014). Cities Outlook 2014. London: Centre for Cities. Retrieved from 
http://www.centreforcities.org/research/outlook14.html 
City Growth Commission. (2014). Unleashing Metro Growth. London: City Growth 
Commission. Retrieved from http://www.citygrowthcommission.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/10/City-Growth-Commission-Final-Report.pdf 
Clarke, J., & Newman, J. (2012). The alchemy of austerity. Critical Social Policy, 32(3), 299–
319.  
Core Cities. (2013). Competitive Cities, Prosperous People. A Core Cities Prospectus for 
Growth. Manchester. Retrieved from 
http://www.corecities.com/sites/default/files/images/publications/Competitive Cities, 
Prosperous People_ Final Draft.pdf 
Cox, E., Henderson, G., & Raikes, L. (2014). Re-balancing the Books - how to make the 
2015 spending review work for all of Britain. Newcastle Upon Tyne: Institute for Public 
Policy and Research. Retrieved from 
http://www.ippr.org/images/media/files/publication/2014/01/rebalancing-the-
books_spending-review-north_Jan2014_11674.pdf 
Cox, E., Raikes, L., & Henderson, G. (2014). Decentralisation Decade: A Plan for Economic 
Prosperity , Public Service Transformation and Democratic Renewal in England. 
Newcastle Upon Tyne: Institute for Public Policy and Research. Retrieved from 
http://www.ippr.org/files/publications/pdf/decentralisation-
decade_Sep2014.pdf?noredirect=1 
Davies, J. S. (2016). Austerian Realism and the Governance of Leicester. In M. Bevir & R. A. 
. Rhodes (Eds.), Rethinking Governance: ruling, rationalities and resistance. Oxford: 
Routledge. 
Page 12 of 15
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/flgs  Email: lgs@contacts.bham.ac.uk
Local Government Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
13 
 
Fitzgerald, A., & Lupton, R. (2015). The Limits to Resilience? The Impact of Local 
Government Spending Cuts in London. Local Government Studies, (June 2015), 1–19. 
Gardner, A., & Lowndes, V. (2015). Negotiating austerity and local traditions. In M. 
Bevir & R. A. . Rhodes (Eds.), Rethinking Governance. Routledge forthcoming. 
Giles, C. (2015). OECD warns Britain to spread spending cuts more evenly. Financial Times, 
(June 3rd). 
Hammond, E. (2015). Devo Why ? Devo How ? Questions (and some answers) about 
governance under English devolution. London: Centre for Public Scrutiny. Retrieved 
from 
http://www.cfps.org.uk/domains/cfps.org.uk/local/media/downloads/CfPS_DEVO_WHY
_RGB.pdf 
Hamnett, C. (2014). Shrinking the welfare state: the structure, geography and impact of 
British government benefit cuts. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 
39(4), 490–503.  
Hastings, A., Bailey, N., Besemer, K., Bramley, G., Gannon, M., & Watkins, D. (2013). 
Coping with the cuts ? Local government and poorer communities. York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/coping-with-
cuts 
Hastings, A., Bailey, N., Bramley, G., Gannon, M., & Watkins, D. (2015). The Cost of the 
Cuts: The Impact on Local Government and Poorer Comunities. York: Joseph 
Rowntree Foundation. Retrieved from http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/cost-cuts-
impact-local-government-and-poorer-communities 
Hastings, A., Bramley, G., Bailey, N., & Watkins, D. (2012). Serving deprived communities in 
a recession. York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation Retrieved from 
http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/communities-recession-services-full.pdf 
Heseltine, M. (2012). No stone unturned. London: Department for Business, Innovation and 
Skills. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/34648/12
-1213-no-stone-unturned-in-pursuit-of-growth.pdf 
HM Government. (2015). Cities and Local Government Devolution Bill. London: HM 
Government. Retrieved from http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2015-
2016/0064/cbill_2015-20160064_en_1.htm 
HM Treasury. (2010). Spending Review 2010. London: The Stationery Office. Retrieved from 
http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_completereport.pdf 
HM Treasury. (2015a). A country that lives within its means: Spending Review 2015. 
London: HMSO. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/447101/a
_country_that_lives_within_its_means.pdf 
HM Treasury. (2015b). Spending review and autumn statement 2015. London: HMSO. 
Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479749/5
2229_Blue_Book_PU1865_Web_Accessible.pdf 
HM Treasury. (2015c). Summer Budget 2015. London: HM Government. Retrieved from 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/443232/5
0325_Summer_Budget_15_Web_Accessible.pdf 
Page 13 of 15
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/flgs  Email: lgs@contacts.bham.ac.uk
Local Government Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
14 
 
House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee. (2013). Prospects for 
codifying the relationship between central and local government. London: The 
Stationery Office. Retrieved from 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-
select/political-and-constitutional-reform-committee/inquiries/parliament-
2010/prospects-for-codifying-the-relationship-between-central-and-local-government/ 
Innes, D., & Tetlow, G. (2015a). Central Cuts , Local Decision-Making : Changes in Local 
Government Spending and Revenues in England , 2009-10 to 2014-15. London: 
Institute for Fiscal Studies. Retrieved from 
http://www.ifs.org.uk/uploads/publications/bns/BN166.pdf 
Innes, D., & Tetlow, G. (2015b). Delivering Fiscal Squeeze by Cutting Local Government 
Spending . Fiscal Studies, 36(3), 303–325.  
Jameson, H. (2015). Devolution deals spark rift in Labour hierarchy. Municipal Journal, (1st 
October), p.1. 
Jenkins, S. (2014). Can England really walk the road to devolution? The Guardian, (23rd 
October). Retrieved from 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/23/england-devolution-tories-
local-councils-more-power 
John, P. (2014). The Great Survivor: The Persistence and Resilience of English Local 
Government. Local Government Studies, 40(5), 687–704.  
Kennett, P., Jones, G., Meegan, R., & Croft, J. (2015). Recession, Austerity and the “Great 
Risk Shift”: Local Government and Household Impacts and Responses in Bristol and 
Liverpool. Local Government Studies, 4(41), 622–644.  
LGA. (2015a). Devolution Map. LGA Website. Retrieved from 
http://www.local.gov.uk/devolution/map 
LGA. (2015b). Shared services. London: Local Government Association. Retrieved from 
http://www.local.gov.uk/documents/10180/49962/L15-
154+Shared+service+infographic+map.pdf/7c21221e-97a6-4338-9875-534caa6d2c24 
Local Government Association. (2015). LGA responds to 2015 Spending Review. LGA 
Website. Retrieved from http://www.local.gov.uk/web/guest/spending-review/-
/journal_content/56/10180/7586753/NEWS 
Lowndes, V. (2002). Between rhetoric and reality: does the 2001 White Paper reverse the 
centralising trend in Britain? Local Government Studies, 28(3), 135–147. 
Lupton, R., Burchardt, T., Fitzgerald, A., Hills, J., Mcknight, A., Obolenska a, P., T Tunstall, 
R. (2015). The Coalition’s Social Policy Record 2010-2015. London: Nuffield 
Foundation. Retrieved from 
http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/sites/default/files/files/RR04_SUMMARY.pdf 
Municipal Journal. (2015a). Care precept “won't plug the cash gap". Municipal Journal, (3rd 
December), p. 9. 
Municipal Journal. (2015b). Island Deal vital to IoW survival. Municipal Journal, (3rd 
September), p.1. 
Municipal Journal. (2015c). West Somerset “teetering on edge.” Municipal Journal, (10th 
September 2015), p.1. 
Page 14 of 15
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/flgs  Email: lgs@contacts.bham.ac.uk
Local Government Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
15 
 
NAO. (2014a). Financial sustainability of local authorities 2014. London: National Audit 
Office. Retrieved from http://www.nao.org.uk/report/financial-sustainability-of-local-
authorities-2014/ 
NAO. (2014b). The impact of funding reductions on local authorities. London: National Audit 
Office. Retrieved from http://www.nao.org.uk/report/the-impact-funding-reductions-local-
authorities/ 
Newman, J. (2013). Performing new worlds? Policy, politics and creative labour in hard 
times. Policy & Politics, 41(4), 515–532.  
Osborne, G. (2015). George Osborne’s Full Speech to Tory Conference. 
www.politicshome.com. Retrieved October 15, 2015, from 
https://www.politicshome.com/party-politics/articles/news/george-osbornes-full-speech-
tory-conference 
Ostry, J. D., Ghosh, A. R., & Espinoza, R. (2015). When Should Public Debt Be Reduced ? 
Retrieved from https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2015/sdn1510.pdf 
Peck, J. (2012). Austerity urbanism. City, 16(6), 626–655.  
Peck, J., & Tickell, A. (2002). Neoliberalizing Space. Antipode, 34(3), 380–404. 
Pickles, E. (2014). “#Ask Pickles” 22nd January 2014. You Tube. Retrieved from 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HaK2EsMoh-4 
Pratchett, L. (2004). Local autonomy, local democracy and the “new localism.” Political 
Studies, 52(2), 358–375. 
Sandford, M. (2015a). Combined authorities. London: House of Commons Library. Retrieved 
from ent\nwww.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN06649.pdf? 
Sandford, M. (2015b). Devolution to local government in England. London: House of 
Commons Library. Retrieved from 
http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SN07029/SN07029.pdf 
Saunders, P. (1982). Why study central-local relations? Local Government Studies, 8(2), 
55–66. 
Taylor-Gooby, P. (2012). Beveridge Overboard? How the UK Government is Using the Crisis 
to Permanently Restructure the Welfare State. In Intereconomics 2012 (pp. 224–229). 
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics. Retrieved from 
http://www.intereconomics.eu/archiv/index.php?mode=jahr&jahr=2012&heftnummer=4 
Taylor-Gooby, P., & Stoker, G. (2011). The Coalition Programme: A New Vision for Britain or 
Politics as Usual? The Political Quarterly, 82(1), 4–15.  
Werran, J., & Hailstone, J. (2014). Merger Mania. Municipal Journal, (23rd January), p. 1. 
Retrieved from http://www.themj.co.uk/article/default.aspx?id=195967&typeid=1 
Wilson, T., Morgan, G., Rahman, A., & Vaid, L. (2013). The local impacts of welfare reform. 
An assessment of cumulative impacts and mitigations. London: Centre for Economic 
and Social Inclusion. Retrieved from http://www.cesi.org.uk/publications/local-impacts-
welfare-reform-assessment-cumulative-impacts-and-mitigations 
Wood, M., Lyall, S., & Bailey, D. (2015). Submission to the Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee Inquiry “The Devolution Debate” September 2015. Sheffield: 
University of Sheffield and New Economics Foundation. 
Page 15 of 15
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/flgs  Email: lgs@contacts.bham.ac.uk
Local Government Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
